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THE SUPREME COURT OF T:r-IE STATE OF UTAB

T4S STATE OF UTA:'-!,

Plaintiff-Respondent,:
-v-

SAVADOP

E. PACHECO,
Case No.

17527

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT IJF T:t"S "7A"'JTRS OF 1'1{E CASE
The appellant, SAVADOR E. PACHF:CO, appeals from a
conviction of Theft in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, SAVADOR E. PACHECO, was found guilty of
Theft,

a Third Degree Felony, by a jury.

The trial was conducted

December 17, 1980 with the Honorable Dean E. Conder, presiding.
Appellant was sentenced m December 22, 1980 to serve an
indeterminate term of 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction.
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STATEMENT OF TBE FACTS
The State filed charges against appellant alleging
Theft occurring on July 28, 1980.

At trial, the owner testified

that he received two checks earlier in the business day and put
them under a handle on the top of a locked cash box.

qe further

testified that the cash box was located in an inner office on a
table.

The owner, when asked if anyone besides a customer was in

the store on that date, testified that he saw a short, dark man
with long hair in the store.

The owner testified that he had a

conversation with this man in which the man asked for a job.
owner told the man no and he went out the front

door.

The

At

approximately 5:30 or 6:00 p.m. that same afternoon, the owner
discovered the checks were missing when he was preparing his daiG
deposit.

He then notified police.
The appellant, testifying in his own behalf through a

translator, testified that he was in the Allstates Wholesale
Company on July 28, 1980.

He testified that he had gone to anothe'

store in the neighborhood to look for work before going to Allsta: 0
'ie testified that he obtained an application from the first busine;
and was carrying it when he went to All states.

Appellant further

testified that when he arrived he didn't see anyone in the store.
He leaned against a counter in front of the store, knocked on it
to get someone's attention, and didn't get any answer.

Appellant

testified that he turned around quickly, knocking some papers off
the counter in doing so.

'ie picked them up and noticed a paper

which looked like scratch paper which people had been doing sums c·
As he was straightening up,

the owner came in and appellant tried

to ask
him
inQuinney
English
for forwork.
Theby the
owner
didn't
seem
Sponsored
by the S.J.
Law Library. Funding
digitization provided
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:1e appellant very well, but he did seem to understand that appellant
ws looking for work.

After being told no, appellant left the

store with the papers in his hand.
After leaving the store appellant testified that he was
going to a factory that manufactured toys.

As he walked away

irom Allstate he put all the papers, including the job application,
in his pocket.

Appellant testified that he took the papers out

later and noticed that two of the pieces of paper had a peso sign
oo them.
~e

It took appellant several minutes to realize that what

had were, in fact, checks.

Appellant testified that he was

always paid in cash in Mexico, where he lived until approximately
:wo years ago, and that no one in his immediate family had checking
accounts.
Appellant testified that after he realized that the pieces
of paper were checks he thought he would either take them back to
the

company or throw them away because

value to him.

he thought they had no

Appellant further testified that he hadn't intended

to take the checks from the Allstate company.
Appellant also presented evidence by expert testimony from
a bank officer in Salt Lake County, Ms. Mary Lou Vrabec, who

testified that the checks admitted as states exhibits but without
endorsements would be of no value to any bank under current banking
oractice.
The Judge denied appellant's motion to charge the jury
only on a Class

B

misdemeanor based on the lack of value of the

c:Ceck.
Appellant was convicted by the jury of the third degree
as charged and after a pre-sentence investigation which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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revealed no prior arrests or convictions, he was sentenced to

pri~-

for the term provided by law.
POINT I
AFTER APPELLANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE AS TO THE
VALUE OF THE CHECKS AND THE STATE DID NOT REBUT
THIS TESTIMONY, COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR 1:'1 fAILING 10 GRANI DEFENJJANI S MOIION
FOR REDUCTION OF '1:1l": CHARGE .
Appellant was charged with theft, a third degree

fel~v• ,

of property over two hundred fifty dollars but less than one
thousand dollars.

Under Utah Code Annotated §76-6-101(4) (a,b,c)

(1953 as amended) the value of stolen property is to be determined
as follows:
"Value" means: the market value of the property
if totally destroyed, at the time and place of the
offense, or where cost of replacement exceeds the
market value; or (b) where the market value cannot
be ascertained, the cost of repairing or replacing
the property within a reasonable time following
the offense, and (c) if the property damaged has
a value that cannot be ascertained by the criteria
set forth in subsections (a) and (b) above, the
property shall be deemed to have a value not to
exceed $50.00.
In State v. Logan, (563 P. 2d Sll) this court stated that
the only definition of value in the criminal code of the State
is found in §76-6-101 (supra).

of~i

The court concluded that this appL

only to property which is totally destroyed and doesn't apply to
property which is merely stolen but later recovered.

The court

further stated:
We find no other statute on this subject and
therefore, conclude that the statute is to be
narrowly construed within its stated meaning
and that there is no existing statute as to
the value of stolen property which is not
ultimately destroyed. That being the case,
we must look to the common law and to the
existing case law to determine the proper
Sponsored by the S.J.
Quinneyof
Law Library.
Fundingapplicable
for digitization provided by
the Institute of Museum
Library Services
test
value
herein.
563 andP.2d
at 813.
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I

The court said that, in general, the measure of the
·;alue is its fair market value at the time and place where the
Ueged crime was committed. (52 A C.J.S. Larceny §60(2) 489).

3

The court then cited State v. Clark, 537 P.2d 820, for the
standard for determining whether the crime charged is to be petit
or grand larceny.

In Clark the court stated:

"There is no doubt that the proper standard
by which a jury should determine "value" in
a case such as this is market value. Market
value is defined in this state as the price
which a well-informed buyer would pay to a
well-informed seller, where neither is obligen
to enter into the transaction. 537 P.2d 15 824.
Since the stolen property in che present case is checks
rhe willing buyer is normally the drawee bank. (People v. Marques,
520 P. 2d 113 (1974)).

in Utah Code Annotated

A check is defineC:

as a negotiable instrument

70 A-3-104 (1953 as amended).

However,

Jtah Code Annotated 70 A-3-201 (3) 1953 as amended, states in part

1

that:
Negotiation of an instrument takes place only
when the endorsement is made and until that
time there is no presumption that the transferee
is the owner.
3ecause the willing

buyer in a check case is normally

the drawee bank, someone knowledgeable in banking procedure is
qualified to present testimony as to the market value of the checks
·.-1hen they were stolen.
:~om ~s.

At:_ trial, appellant introduced testimony

Mary Lou Vrabec as to the value of the checks.

Ms.

.'rabec had been employed in the banking industry for approximately

1

seven and one half years at the time of trial.

Her testimony as

to •1alue follows in part:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q:

Those two checks appear to be issued on the 28th day
of July, 1980, and presuming that those two checks
were in the hands of All states Wholesale, the first
party on that check in the condition which appears 0"
the second of the xeroxed sheet?
·

A:

This one here?

Q:

That's correct.

A:

Okay.

Q:

Can you tell me at that precise moment what the value
of those two pieces of paper would be to Allstateschecks in that same form?

A:

There would be no value until it's properly
and presented.

Q:

What do you mean by endorsed then?

A:

Okay.

Q:

And then what would the value be after it was endorsei

A:

As long as there is no stop payment on the check and.
is collected funds which the maker's bank are willir:5
to release the value would be of the checks.

Q:

All right.
So let me say this,
presuming then that'
know that the amounts on those checks would be paid b:·
the banks, the First Security and the Commerical
Security Banks; would the value still be nothing ~t[
it was endorsed, the value to Allstates would still~
nothing until it was endorsed?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Okay; and when you talk about stop payments and deli·1°
to banks et cetera, that's banking procedure, is that
correct?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And would you say that basically when banks have chec
accounts your bank for instance buys paper from
another bank basically; are you giving out money in
exchange for paper aren't you?

A:

Yes.

enders~

It would have to be endorsed by Allstates

~oh

It is.

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Q:

And those banks do those kind of transactions
all day long. In other words--

A:

True.

Q:

-- in other words look at the value of the paper
and pay money on it in exchange for that paper, right?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And again, in the condition reflected by those xeroxed
copies, what would be the value for instance to your
bank in that same condition?

A:

No value whatsoever.

Earlier in the trial, testimony from the manager of Allstates
revealed that when the checks were stolen, they had not been endorsed.
Thus, Ms. Vrabec's testimony as to the value of the unendorsed checks
fulfills the requirement of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-101 (4)(a) which
defines value as the "value of the property at the time and place of
the offense."

Appellant's witness testified that the value of the

checks when they were stolen was

nothing.

The State presented no

evidence as to any other value and thus appellants witness' testimony
constituted unrebutted evidence.

When evidence is unrebutted, the

court in Thomas v. Thomas (565 P.2d 722) stated:
" ... the legal fundamental is that the court is
bound by undisputed evidence so long as it is not
inherently improbable. 565 P.2d 725.
Obviously here the evidence was not inherently improbable
~d

the trial court erred in denying the motion to reduce the charges

against appellant.

-7-
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POINT II
I

THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE HAS A
RIGHT TO SUBMIT HIS THEORY OF THE CASE TO
THE JURY IN INSTRUCTIONS A"lD FAILURE TO DO
so CONSl'II'DIES PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
A:

It is well established in Utah that an accused in a

I

cri~:·1

action has the right to submit to the jury his theory of the case.
and that such theory when properly requested should be given to
jury in the form of written instructions.
1050 (1931).

t\;

State v. Stenbeck, 2 P.:

This right of the defendant exists as long as there.

any substantial evidence to justify giving such an instruction.
State v. Gillian, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Johnson, 185 P.2d
738 (1947).

In the present case, appellant contends that the evidenc'/
he presented at trial easily met the substantilal evidence test anc I
therefore his proposed instruction pertaining to his theory of the I
case should have been given.

Appellant presented unrebutted test:J

at trial as to the market value of the checks at the time and plac;
the crime was committed and contends that his submitted instructio:
should therefore have been given as proposed:
When the value of property alleged to have been
taken by theft must be determined, the market value
at the time and in the locality of the theft shall
be the test. The value is the highest price,
estimated in terms of money, for which the property
would have sold in the open market at the time and
in the locality, if the owner was desirous of selling,
but under no urgent necessity of doing so, and if
the buyer was desirous of buying but under no urgent
necessity of doing so, and if the seller had a
reasonable time within which to find a purchaser, and
the buyer had knowledge of the character of the
property and of the uses to which it might be put.

-8-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant contends that to refuse to give this
instruction after he put on substantial evidence justifying it was
reversible error as reiterated by the court in Gillian (supra),
quoting State v. Newton, (144 P.2d 290, 1943):
. each party is entitled to have his theory
of the case which is suoported by competent
evidence submitted to the jury by appropriate
instructions, and the failure to present for the
jury's consideration a party's theory by
appropriate instructions constitutes reversible
error. 144 P.2d at 292.
Appellant believes that the facts in his case fit squarely
within the confines of the test above and thus the failure of the
trial court to submit the proposed instruction clearly constitutes
reversible error.
POINT II
B: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING
INSTRUCTIONS 18 AND 22 BECAUSE THEY--wfRE
INCORRECT STATEMENTS OF THE LAW IN UTAH.
Appellant contends that the court erred when it gave
instruction Number eighteen to the jury because it plainly misstated
the law in Utah.

The instruction given by the court is as follows:

You have been instructed regarding the essential
elements of the crime of theft which the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The State
need only prove those essential elements.
In other words, in the crime of Theft, it is not
necessary for the State to prove and you are not
to consider in your deliberations, whether the
checks had any value to the person who took them
from the owner.
The second paragraph of this instruction is a misinterpretation of the
law.

The controlling statute in this case is Utah Code Annotated

P6-6-101 (4-a, b, c), 1953 as amended, which states:
-9-
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"Value" means:
a) the market value of the
property if totally destroye4 at the time
and place of the offense, or where cost of
replacement exceeds the market value; or
b) where the market value cannot be
ascertained, the cost of repairing or
replacing the property within a reasonable
time following the offense, c) if the
property damaged has a value that cannot
be ascertainea by the criteria set forth
in subsections a) and b) above, the
property shall be deemed to have a value
not to exceed $50.00.

If the property was not destroyed but later recovered, the controi:
case is State v. Logan, supra, which held that the appropriate

~~

to be used is the market value of the property; that is, the priCT
a well-informed buyer would pay to a well-informed seller where
neither is obliged to enter into the transaction (State v. Logan,
563 P.2d 811, 1977).

It is obvious that neither the controlling

statute nor Logan,supra, which interprets the statute, have any
language pertaining to value which could possibly be used as a
basis for instruction number eighteen.

Appellant contends that t·'

giving of this instruction was a misstatement of the law which
resulted in prejudicial error.
Appellant also contends that court's instruction number
twenty-two, for the same reasons

as enumerated immediately above

is also erroneous and a misstatement of the law.

Instruction twer

two as given to the jury is as follows:
You may find that a check is a writing which
represents value to the owner.
In determining
the amount of value of a check you may consider
the written face value of the check and the
testimony of competent witnesses as to the
value of the check.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~his

instruction obviously distorts the law by weighting the

:estimony of the State's witness and giving no legal credit to the
evidence that appellant presented.
In a recent case, the court observed that even if defendant
argued his theory to the jury ( which did not occur in the present
case) it would be no help where " the jury was misinformed about the
law to be applied." (State v. Wanrow, SS9 P.2d S4S, at SSS, 1977).
~

clarify the standard on review the court quoted a test set out

in State v. Britton, (178 P.2d 341) which is to be applied to cases
in which the instruction given is an erroneous statement of the law;
When the record disclosed an error in an instruction
given on behalf of the party in whose favor the
verdict was returned, the error is presumed to have
been prejudicial, and to furnish ground for reversal,
unless it affirmatively appears that it was harmless ...
A harmless error is an error which is trivial, or
formal, or merely academic, and was not prejudicial
to the substantial rights of the party assigning
it, and in no way affected the final outcome of
the case. (Emphasis added) Id. at SSS.
Applying this test to the instant case, it is evident that
the errors in court's given instructions eighteen and twenty-two
:•ere not harmless and thus were clearly prejudicial to appellant's case.

Thus, it is appellant's contention that these erroneous instructions
constitute reversible error.
POINT III

APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED WHEN, IN FI~AL REBUTTAL,
THE PROSECUTOR STATED THAT SHE :IAD TAKEN GOOD NOTES
DURING TRIAL AND PROCEEDED TO TESTIFY FROM HER NOTES
AS A WITNESS BEFORE THE JURY.
-11-
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This court recently reiterated the State's general

pol~,

that, although charged with vigorously enforcing the laws the
prosecutor:
"has a duty to not only secure appropriate
convictions, but an even higher duty to see that
justice is done. In his role as the State's
represetntative in criminal matters, the
prosecutor, therefore, must not only attempt
to win cases, but must see that justice is done.
/
Walker v. State of Utah, 624 P.2d 687, at 691.
J
See also Codianna v. Morris, 594 P.2d 874, at 877 (1979)
During her final rebuttal, the prosecutor stated to the j:..
"Did he say he usually kept checks in his cash box
in his inner office? I say he didn't. I wrote
down these guestions before I asked him and I
wrote down is answers." (Emphasis added).
These statements of the prosecutor are clearly improper and amount

:I

the giving of unsworn testimony.
In State v. Valdez (513 P. 2d 422) the court pointed out th;:
"counsel for both sides have considerable latitude
in their arguments to the jury, they have a right
to discuss fully from their standpoints the
evidence and the inferences and deductions arising
therefrom. The test of whether the remarks made
by counsel are so objectionable as to merit a
reversal in a criminal case is, did the remarks call
to the attention of thejurors matters which they
would not be justified in considering in determining
their verdict, and were they, under the circumstances
of the particular case, probably influenced by those
remarks. 513 P.2d at 426.
Appellant contends that the statements by the prosecutor, amounting
to unsworn testimony did fulfill the requirements of the test in
Valdez (supra).

Prosecutor's introduction of her own unsworn testi::

certainly called jurors attention to matter which they normally
would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict
Considering prosecutor's status as the State's representative, it
is highly likely that, under these circumstances, the jurors were
Sponsored by the by
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Utah Code Annotated §77-42-1 (1953 as amended) sets out
rhe standard for judgment on appeal:
"After hearing an appeal the court must give
judgment without regard to errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties. If error has been committed,
it shall not be presumed to have resulted in
~rejudice.
The court must.be.satisfied that
it has that effect before it is warranted in
reversing the judgment.
T~is

statute was interpreted in State v.

~aton,

~hen

the court stated that the question was whether, in light of the

569 P.2d 1114 (1977)

total picture, the prosecutors impropriety should be regarded as a
prejudicial error and justify reversal of the conviction.

The

court noted that there should be no reversal merely to criticize
a prosecutor who merely averstepped

However, in the case at bar, the prosecutor's remarks were

I

::\

the bounds of propriety.

not merely an overstepped

of the bounds of propriety, but were of

a nature that could easily be seen as prejudical error.

The court

I

in Eaton,

supra, specifically spelled out the standard to be met

in cases of prosecutorial misconduct when it held:

. . we believe that, on appeal, when there is a
reasonable doubt as to whether the error below was
prejudicial, that doubt should be resolved in
favor of the defendant . . . consequently, the rule
which we have numerous timesstated is that if the
error is such as to justify a belief that it had
a substantially a:lverse effect upon the defendant's
right to a fair trial, in that there is a
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there
may have been a different result, then the error
should not have been regarded as harmless."
569 P.2d at 1116.
Adhering to this standard, it seems clear that the prosecutor's comments (in the present case) served to produce a substantially adverse effect on the appellant's right to a fair trial
\:i

addir.g testimony as a witness without appellant being able to
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confront or cross examine her.

Thus, appellant contends that her

comments raised more than a reasonable doubt that her corrrrnents
were prejudicial.

The duty of the prosecutor was very aptly

stated by Justice Sutherland in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 79 L.Ed. 1314, 55 S. Ct. 629 (1935):
. . . It is as much his duty to refrain from
methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to brin~ about a just one.
It is fair
to say that the average jury, in a greater or
less degree, has confidence that these
obligations which so plainly rest upon the
prosecuting attorney, will be faithfuly
observed. (79 L. Ed at 1321).
Thus, it is appellant's contention that the prosecutor's
conmients were more than just improper, and that by, in effect

givin~

unsworn testimony, she severely prejudiced the outcome of appellant'
case.
CONCLUSION
Appellant contends that the court erred in not granting
appellant's motion for a reduction of the charge after unrebutted
testimony was presented which demonstrated that thec:hecks were
valueless.
Appellant also contends that the Court's instructions to
the jury were an erroneous statement of the law.

Appellant further

contends that the court committed reversible error in failing to
instruct the jury on appellant's theory of the case.

Finally, it's

appellant's contention that the prosecutor's misconduct in final
rebuttal severely prejudiced the outcome of the case.
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Thus, appellant asks that his conviction be reversed
and judgment of acquittal be entered.

DATED this

~-day

of June, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,

(,.~~/;;il£c,;bU u
GINGER L. FLETCHER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84114 this

~~-day

of June, 1981.
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